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1. INTRODUCTION Policy discussions concerning intemal efficiency and competition frequently presume that market integration enhances the intemal efficiency of the participating firms. In fact, this is one of the arguments advocated in favor of the European union. The European commission writes that " ... the new competitive pressures brought about by the completion of the internal market can be expected to ... produce appreciable gains in internal efficiency ... " ( [2] , p.126). Such a view indeed has support from certain major classics: "... good management, .. , can never be universally established but in consequence of the free and universal competition which forces every body to have recourse to it for the sake of self-defence ... " (Adam Smith [17] , pp. 163-164).
By contrast, current standard microeconomics text-book treatments do not deal with this issue: all firms by assumption operate at maximal intemal efficiency, irrespective of market conditions. A monopoly firm is internally just as efficiently organized as is a firm in an oligopolistic or perfectly competitive market. However, recent theoretical studies of this issue have shown that if the basic model of the firm is expanded to include an agency problem then market conditions may indeed influence the intemal efficiency of a firm. More specifically, the incentive power of equilibrium contracts between owners and management may depend on externai market conditions. As a result, manageriai efIorts to improve the intemal efficiency of the firm may change when market conditions change, though not always in the expected direction, see Holmström [8] , Hart [3] , Nalebuff and Stiglitz [13] , Scharfstein [15] , Hermalin [6] , Martin [12] , Horn, Lang and Lundgren (9] , and Schmidt [16J.
The term "internal efficiency" used in this literature is perhaps unfortunate, and was originally kept undefined. In his semin al paper on this topic, Leibenstein [lOJ avoided to give a definition but introduced the term X-inefficiency. Broadly speaking, the terms "internal efficiency" and "X-efficiency" were used much in the same way as the layman would use the term "good management." Here these terms will be understood in the narrow sense of "low production costs." A firm that operates at a lower cost at all output levels than another firm will be called "internally more efficient." In particular, "internal efficiency" has little, if anything, to do with Pareto efficiency (since it neglects welfare effects on managers).
In contrast to the cited information-based approaches, the present study takes the viewpoint that market conditions may influence managers' incentives to improve intemal efficiency even in the absence of agency problems. In order to study this possibility in its pures t form we thus assume that firms are managed by their owners. Such managers care about profits, but they may also have preferences concerning the effort they put into their firm. An owner who operates his or her own firm may INTERNAL EFFICIENCY AND EXTERNA L CONDITlONS 3 thus face a trade-off between profits and leisure -taken to be the opposite of effort.
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Exerting more manageriai effort -more intense work, longer hours in the office, or less pleasant decisions (such as firing staff) -the owner-cum-manager may improve the firm's internai efficiency and thereby its profits. Moreover, this trade-off may depend on market conditions. For instance, under stiffer competition, equilibrium profits may be lower, and the marginal return to increased effort on profit mayor may not be higher. The in come effect on manageriai effort is unambiguously positive in such circumstances if leisure is a normal good. As sir John Hicks put it: " The best of all monopoly profits is the quiet life." (Hicks [7] , p. 8). However, the total effect also depends on the substitution effect, and, of course, on what exactly is meant by "stiffer competition." In particular, reduction of barriers to entry involves one form of "stiffened competition" while market integration involves another form of "stiffened competition." Income and substitution effects of trade barriers on manageriai incentives, in markets where all firms are price takers, have been studied in Corden [1] and J. Martin [11] . The present approach can be viewed as an extension of Martin's model to imperfectly competitive markets with and without barriers to entry. The income effect on manageriai effort is studied in the context of an agency model in Hermalin [6] .
In terms of analytical toois, the present paper suggests a minor extension of the basic microeconomics text-book model of the firm, perhaps the slightest extension that includes manageriai effort as a non-traded input. More exactly, instead of treating a firm's production possibilities as exogenous (and known) to every manager, we here endogenize the production possibility set of a firm by letting it in part depend on its manager's efforts. 2 The more such efforts the manager makes, the more production opportunities become available to the firm. Indeed, it may be argued that an essentiai part of management's task is precisely to identify production possibilities available to the firm. This view was advocated by Hayek, who saw economic agent's acquisition of knowledge as a fundamental aspect of an economy: " ... knowledge ... is not given to anyone in its totality ... " (Hayek [4] , p.32l), "it is only through the process of competition that the facts will be discovered" (Hayek [5] , p.96).
Leibenstein's [10] treatment was essentially informal and empirical. On the basis of his empirical studies he claimed that "The simple fact is that neither individuals nor firms work as hard, nor do they search for information as effectively, as they could.
The importance of motivation and its association with degree of effort and search arises because the relation between inputs and outputs is not a determinate one." (p.
l We will neglect the realistic possibility that managers may associate positive utility with some positive levels of effort. However, a generalization in this direction does not seem difficult.
2For the sake of simplicity it is here assumed that all managers are equalIy able. The present analysis is performed in a simple formal model, restricted to the case of a Cournot market for ahomogenous product, and focuses on two polar cases: (a) a given set of firms in the market, and (b) free entry to and exit from the market. When the set of firms is fixed all managers simultaneously choose their levels of managerial effort. In the case of free entry we imagine a large population of potential entrepreneurs, each of whom first decides whether or not to set up a firm, and thereby become its owner-cum-manager, in the studied product market. All entrepreneurs have access to all production factors and inputs, at fixed and given prices. As an alternative to setting up a firm, each entrepreneur has some (unmodeled) outside option. Once the entry decisions have been taken, these decisions become known to all entrants, and these simultaneously choose their levels of managerial effort -just as in the case of a given set of firms. The analysis presumes identical entrepreneursjmanagers, and is focused on symmetri c market equilibria.
INTERNAL EFFICIENCY AND EXTERNAL CONDITlONS
It tums out that the comparative statics analysis of how managers adapt their efforts to changed market conditions is formally parallel to dassical models of the price-taking consumer. In the ca se of a fixed set of firms in the market the analysis is similar to the Marshallian demand analysis, while under free entry it takes the form of Ricksian demand analysis. In the first case, changed market conditions induce an income and a substitution effect on managers' efforts, while in the second case managers are kept at their reservation utility level (the income effect on their effort is "compensated"). In bot h cases there is a major difference in comparison with dassical con sumer demand analysis. Instead of a non-strategic environment (price-taking consumers) we here have a strategic environment (the price of leisure is influenced by each manager's action).
Conditions are identified under which an increased number of firms in a given market induces managers to exert more effort. Rence, stiffer competition so defined leads to increased intemal efficiency (lower unit cost of production). A central concern of this study is whether market integration (or trade liberalization) induces higher intemal efficiency. The thought-experiment is simple: put together two markets -"countries" -that were before completely isolated from each other. Conditions are identified under which such a ch ange in external conditions results in increased intemal efficiency, both when the number of firms per market (country) is fixed and unaffected by the change, and when there is free entry and exit of firms before and af ter the integration.
In both cases, consumers benefit more from trade than in the standard Cournot model: to the pressure on the market price from an increased number of competitors is added the effect from reduced production costs in each firm. According to Leibenstein [lOJ the second effect is empirically much stronger than the former. Including the welfare effect on entrepreneurs, the net welfare effect of market integration under free entry is unambiguous: consumers face a lower price of the product and all entrepreneurs remain at their reservation utility level. Market integration is thus a Pareto improvement.
By adopting the present approach, which neglects informational problems, I do not suggest that such problems are unimportant for the questions at hand. On the contrary, such problems seem to be of fundamental importance. However, in the spirit of Occam's razor the present study seeks to find the simplest setting which allows for the possibility that market conditions influence the internai efficiency of firms. Richer and more complex models, such as those based on asymmetric information between owners and managers, can hopefully be more easily understood and appreciated against the background of such simpler modeis.
For a discussion of various concepts of efficiency and competition, and the interplay between these, see Vickers [18J. A recent empirical investigation of relations between competition and corporate performance is given in Nickell [14J.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and section 3 the analytical results. Numerical results for a parametric special case are given in Section 4, which also contrast Marshallian demand analysis with Hicksian demand analysis of managers' decisions. Section 5 concludes with a brief discussion of some potential extensions. Mathematical proofs are not included; they are provided in a companion working paper, Weibull [19J.
THE MODEL
The model is developed in two steps. First, the set of firms participating in the product market in question is taken to be fixed and given. Then entry and exit decisions are introduced. In other words, we first study a "post-entry" subgame of a larger game, then the full game.
The demand side.
Consider a Cournot product market for ahomogeneous good, with n identical firms. The market price p is determined by an inverse demand function, p = Pm(Q), where Q is aggregat e output, Q = 'L J =l qj. Here m is an exogenous parameter that will be interpreted as the number of (identical) countries in a free-trade area for the good in question. With linear demand in each country, D(p) = 1 -p, and in the absence of transportation costs, aggregate demand in the free-trade area is mD(p) = m -mp. Motivated by this example, the following assumption will be maintained throughout the analysis:
where m > O.
Production costs and manageriai effort.
Each firm is managed by its owner. The key assumption in this study is that managerial efIorts can reduce the firm's production costs. The channel from managerial effort to production eos t is thought to go via the firm's production possibility set, or, equivalently, via its family of input requirement sets (one for each output quantity). Here it is assumed that the manager can expand the input requirement set associated with any given output level by exerting more managerial effort. Formally, if V(q, e) is the input requirement set associated with output level q when the manager exerts effort e, then the total cost to produce q is C(q,w,e) = min w· z ,
where w is the price vector for inputs. The assumption that the manager can expand the input requirement set can be formally stated as: e < e' :::::? V(q, e) C V(q, e') "i/q.3 Tt follows from (2) that the production cost C(q, w, e) is non-increasing in managerial effort e. 4 For the sake of analytical simplicity, the subsequent analysis will be focused on the special case when there is no fixed cost, and, at any given level of managerial effort, the firm's unit (or marginal) cost is constant. This unit cost is assumed to be continuously decreasing in managerial effort at a non-increasing rate. The domain of the effort variable is normalized to the unit interval, and the price vector w is notationally suppressed (since this will be held constant ):
The assumption of a constant unit cost holds if production exhibits constant returns-to-scale (eRS) in non-managerial inputs.
When aggregate output is Q, price is p = l Q/m, byequation (l). Subtracting production costs from revenues, we obtain the following expression for the profit to firm i: Hence, a manager's utility is increasing in her firm's profit. This is the case if the manager receives a monetary reward that is an increasing function of her firm's profit, grant ed she does not consume the product in the studied market (the price of which is endogenous). Moreover, the marginal utility of profit, <pi, is decreasing at a rate that is sufficient ly high to keep the relative risk aversion of the subutility function <p above one half. The disutility of manageriai effort increases with effort, from zero to plus infinit y, as effort goes from its lower to its upper bound. AIso the marginal disutility of effort is increasing with effort.
Solution concepts.
The interaction between the n managers in the product market is modeled as a simultaneous-move game in which each manager i ehooses a combination (ei, qi) of effort and output in order to maximize her utility U(7fi' ei).
The focus will be on symmetric Nash equilibria, i.e., Nash equilibria in which all participating managers choose the same output q and the same effort e.
In the case of free entry and exit such product market interaction will be embedded as a "post entry" sub game of a larger game that involves an "entry stage" in which the number of participating firms is determined endogenously. We then imagine an infinite population of identical entrepreneurs, each of whom may set up a firmbecome an owner-cum-manager -in the product market in question. The alternative sThe relative risk aversion r<.p of the subutility function cp is defined by r<.pCrr) = -7rcpll(7r)/cp'(7r).
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is to take some outside option that yields utility il E JR. The equilibrium number of partieipating firms, n, will be treated as a real, rather than integer, variable. Consequently, the equilibrium utility to all entrepreneurs, those who enter and those who stay out, is the same, il.
ANALYSIS
It tums out to be analytieally eonvenient to make a transformation of variables before one embarks on sueh an analysis. Instead of using eaeh managers effort ei as a deeision variable, we will use her effective effort, defined as Xi = 1 c( ei). By eondition (A), there is a one-to-one relation between ei and Xi, sueh that Xi is strictly inereasing from zero to one as ei inereases from zero to one. Henee, it is deeision-theoretieally (and strategieally) immateriai if we use ei or Xi as part of i's strategy. For later notationai eonvenienee we will write b for the inverse C-l to the unit-eost function c. Conditions (A) and (B) will be assumed to hold throughout this section.
3.1.
Given set of firms in the market. As mentioned ab ove , the foeus is here on symmetrie Nash equilibrium in the interaction between the n managers in the produet market. Using the above transformation of variables, a strategy to manager i is a pair Si = (Xi, qi) E (0,1) X lR.+, and the payoff to manager i, when a strategy A neeessary first-order eondition for interior Nash equilibrium is, for eaeh i = 1, ... ,n:
6The function c is a bijection from the interval [0,1] to itself. has positive marginal utility to the manager, she should, at any effort level that she chooses, adapt her firm's output optimally to its unit (marginal) cost. In symmetric equilibrium all effort levels, and hence unit costs, are the same, and equation (6) results. This equation also shows that the more effort managers exert in a symmetri c equilibrium, the more output will their firms produce. The exact relation between effort and output depends on market conditions, here represented by market size, m, and the number of firms, n. Market conditions matter. Another necessary first-order condition for interior Nash equilibrium is, for each
Hence, in a symmetri c equilibrium the following equation in one variable, the effective managerial effort x, holds (we have used (6)):
(8)
Increased effort has a direct and an indirect effect on utility. The indirect effect comes about via the induced increase in profit, involving also optimal adaptation of output. The first term above represents this indirect effect of a marginal increase in effort, and the second term (negative) represents the direct effect. This equation plays a key role in the subsequent analysis.
It is not difficult to show that equation (8) has a unique solution x* E (0,1). In view of this result the question arises whether the found pair (x*, q*), with q* determined from x* in equation (6), indeed represents a Nash equilibrium. A sufficient condition for this to hold is that the resulting utility to a manager, u(x*, q*), exceeds the utility she would obtain when producing zero and making no effort, <p(0) -~(O) <p(0): if u(x*, q*) > <p(0), then there exists exactly one symmetric Nash equilibrium. Equation (8) permits certain comparative statics observations. In particular, it is not difficult to show that its solution, the equilibrium level x* of effective managerial effort, rises with the number n of firms. An increase in the number n of firms reduces both the equilibrium profits per firm and the marginal return to effort. However, the ineome effect dominates the substitution effect: Proposition 1. Equilibrium managerial effort is strictly increasing in the number n of nrms in a market of nxed size m.
Inereased eompetition, in this speeifie sense, enhanees firms' internai effieieney. This is, for example, the ease if barriers to entry are redueed so that new firms enter the market. Deregulatian and privatization policies may clearly have sueh effects.
When the number of firms in a market inereases, then eonsumers benefit more from inereased eompetition in the present model than they do in the standard Cournot model. On top of the usual beneficiai eonsequenee from alarger number of firms operating at given productian eosts, we here have an ineentive effect inside firms that brings down produetion eosts in eaeh firm. Formally, the equilibrium market priee, p*, is given by a eonvex eombination of the unit east c(e*) and 1:
n+l n+l (9) The weight to the unit east is smaller the more firms there are in the market. 8 Since the uni t eost is less than one, the equilibrium priee decreases when the number of firms inereases, at any fixed level of manageriai effort, and equilibrium effort rises, the unit east c(e*) decreases with the number of firms in the market. Henee, the "standard" oligopolistie priee effect from an inerease in the number n of firms is enhaneed.
One would expect that managers' utility falls with an inerease in the number of firms in the market. This follows readily from the above observations: manager's equilibrium utility, v(n, m), is a eontinuous and strictly decreasing function of n (at any given and fixed value of market size m). In view of the downward pressure from an inereased number of firms on the market priee we eonclude that utility is transferred from managers to eonsumers as the number of firms in the market rises. 
Free entry and exit.
In equilibrium in the full entry game no active entrepreneur, i.e., an entrepreneur who deeided to enter and beeome the manager-cumowner of a firm, obtains a utility below her reservation utility il. In this sense, no active entrepreneur has an ineentive to exit. Moreover, the number of firms in the reached subgame is sueh that if one more firm had entered, then the resulting equilibrium utility in that sub game would have fallen below il. In this sense, no passive 8In the limit case n -+ 00 of perfect competition, all weight is given to the unit cost: the market price then equals the unit (or marginal) production cost.
9It is presumed here that consumers' welfare is decreasing in the market price p.
entrepreneur has an incentive to enter. Since the number of participating firms is here treated as a real, rather than integer, variable, the equilibrium utility to all entrepreneurs, active and passive alike, is exactly il: a single equation replaces two inequalities. The subsequent analysis concerns only symmetric equilibria in the produet market, and it is assumed in this subsection that the outside option is better than setting up a firm and then running it at zero output (and effort) level: il> <p(0). As observed above, managers' equilibrium utility level v(n, m) is continuously and strictly decreasing in n. Hence, for any reservation utility level il E ~ there exists at most one (real) number n 2: l of firms such that all entrepreneurs are indifferent between market entry and the outside option. If the reservation utility il is too highabove a monopolist's utility level -then no such n exists. Likewise, if the reservation utility il is too low -below the utility level of a manager of a firm in a perfeetly competitive market -then no such n exists. In the first case the number of firms in the market is zero, and in the latter case it is plus infinity. However, the latter case is excluded since in the limit case of infinitely many firms the utility to a manager is at most <p(0) , a utility level that by assumption is below il. This question can be answered by way of the following thought experiment. Imagine that the produet market initially is in a symmetri c interior Nash equilibrium with n active firms, each producing output quantity q*, and each manager exerting effective effort X*. Suppose some manager i contempiates alternative effortjoutput pairs for herself. If she chooses effortjoutput pair (Xi, qi), while all other firms remain at their equilibrium output level, her firm's profit becomes (11) While profit and effort affeet her utility directly, her firm's output matters only indireetly to her, via its effect on her firm's profit. Suppose that manager i, given any effective effort Xi that she contemplates to exert, chooses her firm's output level qi so that her firm's profit is maximized, conditional on her effeetive effort Xi and under the hypothesis that the other firms produee their equilibrium output q*. It is easily verified (using (6) ) that she will then ehoose m { n-l} qi = 2 max 0, Xi -n + l x* . (12) As expeeted, the manager will thus ehoose a higher output level the more effort she has deeided to exert. At low level of effort, her firm's unit eost Ci = l -Xi is so high that the optimum output level is zero. From the viewpoint of the resulting utility to the manager, we may without loss of generality assume that she eonsiders only effedive effort levels Xi that exeeed ~~i x*. Given sueh ehoiees of effort, and with optimal adaptation of output to effort, the profit to firm i is the following eonvex inereasing fundion of its manager's effedive effort:
The graph of this function defines the manager's "possibility frontier" in the (7ri' Xi )-plane. These are the best eombinations of profit and effeetive effort available to the manager when all other managers exert their equilibrium effort. In the same plane we may draw indifferenee eurves for manager i. The optimal effedive effort for manager i is x*, a point of tangeney between her possibility frontier and one of these indifferenee eurves. Under free entry this indifferenee eurve is determined by an increase in the number n*(m) of firms. Assuming that the reservation utility of managers is unaffected, the effect of market integration is that the tangency point with the reservation utility indifferenee curve may move. Hence, no income effect is here at work, all hinges on the substitution effect. If the tangency point moves as market size changes, then manageriaI effort and profit necessarily move in the same direction: either both increase or both decrease (in order to keep utility constant). It turns out that both increase. It is as if managers trade "leisure" for "money" when the market expands. Consequently, market integration under free entry and exit enhances the internaI efficiency of firms.
Proposition 2. Equilibrium managerial efIort under free entry and exit is strictly increasing in market size m.
By assumption the utility of all entrepreneurs remains constant under market integration. However, consumers in the product market benefit in two ways. On top of the well known increased "allocative" efficiency gain due to the increased number of participating firms, resulting in a lower market price, managers work harder and so firms operate under lower costs, adding to the downward pressure on the market price. Granted that con sumers , welfare is decreasing in the price of the product in question, we conclude that market integration is a Pareto improvement: a welfare gain for consumers and no welfare loss for managers.
Remark: This conclusion rests, inte r alia, upon the assumption that managers' reservation utility, u, is unaffected by the change in market conditions. The qualitative result still holds (by continuity) if u increases only slightly. Another presumption is that factor prices (implicit in the definition of the marginal cost) are unaffected.
EXAMPLE
The above analysis is particularly simple in the special case of a linear relation between manageriaI effort and unit cost, combined with Cobb-Douglas preferences. Let
and
for som e A > 0. 
A striking feature of this equation is that the market size parameter m is absent. Hence, in this special ca se equilibrium managerial effort, and hence also the internal efficiency of firms, is independent of market size. As expected, the equilibrium effort level is increasing in the number n of firms and decreasing in managers' taste ,\ for leisure. Moreover, as the number of firms tend to infinit y, the equilibrium managerial effort approaches its upper bound, 1, irrespective of managers' taste ,\ > O for leisure.
Hence, in the limit of perfect competition even the most leisure-loving managers exert maximal effort.
In contrast to effort and price, output and profit per firm do depend on market
4.2. Free entry. As expected, the number of firms in the market under free entry is increasing in market size:
Note the concavity of the function n*: market integration results in a reduction of the total number of firms.
Inserting the expression for n*(m) in equation (18) First suppose the number n of firms and market size m both are fixed and given. Any change in market conditions, i.e., in these two parameters, results in a shift of the budget set B(n, m), and the effects on managers's demand for leisure -hence supply of manageriaI effort -can be studied just as in Marshallian demand analysis. The effect on managers' choice of leisure can be decomposed into an "income effect," i.e., aparallel shift of the "budget curve," and a "substitution" effect, i.e., a change in the slope of the "budget curve". Second, suppose only market size m is fixed and given, while the number of firms is determined by free entry and exit. Then the effects on managers' choice of leisure from a change in market size can be studied in the spirit of the Hicksian compensated demand analysis. For any ch ange in m is fully compensated by entry and exit of firms -so that all managers remain at their initial utility level. What changes is only the "relative price" of leisure as against consumption -here given by the "possibility frontier." Figure 3 shows how this frontier changes as the market size m changes. It is as if market integration induces a higher (here non-linear) "relative price" of leisure. The reservation utility indifferenee curve, and the "possibility frontier" associated with a small market (the flat ter curve), and with a large market (the steeper curve), respecti vely.
EXTENSIONS AND VARIATIONS
The above analysis of the question of whether market conditions may influence the internai efficiency of firms internai efficiency was restricted to a particular setting. Hence, a variety of extensions are called for before robust conclusions can be claimed.
Here is a list of a few such extensions. First, the present study has been restricted to manageriai incentives to cut production costs. Incentives to promote product quality and implement useful technical innovations are highly relevant potential extensions. In such a setting the present description of" entrepreneurs" may be enriched. Second, the present analysis rests upon the heroic assumption that demand is linear. Are the qualitative results valid under more general demand specifications? Third, an important extension of the present model would be to allow for general equilibrium effects, both with respect to factor prices and to managers' outside options.
